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Abstract
While often treated as distinct, both politics and journalism share in their histories a need for a public that is not naturally
assembled and needs instead to be ‘constructed’. In earlier times the role of mediating politics to publics often fell to
news media, which were also dependent on constructing a ‘public’ for their own viability. It is hardly notable to say this
has changed in a digital age, and in the way social media have allowed politicians and political movements to speak to
their own publics bypassing news voices is a clear example of this. We show how both established politics and emerging
political movements now activate and intensify certain publics through their media messages, and how this differs in the
UK, Spain and the Netherlands. When considering journalism and social media, emphasis on their prominence can mask
more complex shifts they ushered in, including cross-national differences, where they have pushed journalism towards
social media to communicate news, and where political actors now use these spaces for their own communicative ends.
Building upon this research, this article revisits conceptualizations of the ways political actors construct publics and argues
that we see processes of disintermediation taking place in political actors’ social networks on Twitter.
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1. Introduction
Politicians tweet massively. Of this, we are fairly well as-
sured. Yet whether we follow the news, or scrutinize the
bevy of research examining political actors’ social me-
dia use, we continue to benefit from improving the ways
we think about political actors’ social media practices,
and their hitherto unexplored implications. In this arti-
cle we therefore shift the gaze slightly to the receiving
end, looking not just at how political actors’ use Twitter,
but for the implications of such use on the recipients—
their publics. Building upon an empirical analysis of the
Twitter networks of political actors in the UK, the Nether-
lands, and Spain, via Twitter, we explore in this arti-
cle a conceptual argument for how publics are con-
structed through the relationships between political ac-
tors’ Twitter accounts and those within their networks.
This places a critical lens on how we understand the in-
terrelation between the public, the press, and political
power centers as they continue to evolve in a digital age.
Specifically, this article aims to address discrepancies
in our fulsome understanding of the political-public rela-
tionship by exploring the implications of the direct com-
municative practice of political actors on Twitter. We
show how this is not only a development in the way polit-
ical speechmanifests in contemporary societies, but also
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a potential wresting away of this role from the previous
intermediaries of political affairs and public concerns—
the news media (Broersma & Graham, 2015). This con-
siders how political actors’ tweets may be narrowly
aimed at their more engaged publics as an evolution in
the conceptualization of a ‘constructed public’, achieved
throughmessages directed towards particular audiences,
based on the perceived expectations those publics hold
(Conboy & Eldridge, 2018, p. 172). In studying the net-
works within which political actors speak to members of
the public, we argue the ways in which political actors
have seized on the opportunities of Twitter may signal a
power shift in who is the primary constructor of publics.
We theorize this as the appropriation of socio-functional
roles of public construction which were previously asso-
ciated with a journalistic field; in other words, away from
those who used to have full control over these roles. This
article is a first step towards approaching such questions
in larger studies, including those using network analyses
and longitudinal approaches.
As a way to assess the implications for the ways
we understand political actors’ ability to construct their
publics, we bring into dialogue research on the evolving
relationship between the press, public, and political ac-
tors, to conceptualize the constituted public within the
mediated public sphere. We then offer a social network
analysis (SNA) of politicians’ and parties’ Twitter activ-
ities in the UK, the Netherlands, and Spain to explore
specifically howpolitical actors construct publics through
Twitter and if this differs between media systems. From
this analysis, we offer insights into how publics are being
constructed on Twitter and ask whether, by employing
network analysis, we can identify ways in which publics
are assembled. Where politicians succeed in such con-
struction, in our findings we point to potential implica-
tions for journalism’s erstwhile role as conduit between
the political and the public within more dynamic and
complex media systems. We situate this discussion as a
conceptual argument in order to offer directions for fu-
ture work which would then consider the content within
these networks.
While it has become altogether clear that social me-
dia offer a set of media spaces and practices which have
been adopted by politicians, in light of a concern that
politicians’ Twitter use reflects not an enhancement of
communication but rather the fragmentation of societies
and the dissolution of a normative public sphere, the
questions explored become critical for situating such dy-
namicswithin the function ofWestern societies (Batorski
& Grzywińska, 2018; Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson, 2014).
Drawing from a body of work which examines how politi-
cians use online opportunities to connect to the wider
populace (Gurevitch, Coleman, & Blumler, 2009), how
social media and Twitter in particular offer avenues
for members of the public to lobby their political ac-
tors (Graham, Broersma, Hazelhoff, & van’t Haar, 2013;
Tromble, 2018), and how the press has been stepped
over when this occurs (Graham, Jackson, & Broersma,
2018), this article looks at the construction of the pub-
lic alongside the conceptualization of a mediated public
sphere, evident within these practices.
Empirically, this article looks to Twitter to examine
an active space of public construction for politicians and
political movements in a random non-election period in
2018. This allows us to analyze the day-to-day practices
of politicians and their ongoing effects on the construc-
tion of publics, while the majority of research focuses
on politician’s online behavior during a short-term peak
in election times. Through a comparative analysis of the
main accounts of both established and movement poli-
tics, we offer an initial assessment of how the construc-
tion of publics on social media differs cross-nationally
and where this may signal a reorientation of power
within the increased commonality of political communi-
cation on social media. By comparing movement politics
and established politics engaged in the construction of
publics, we are able to offer a more holistic snapshot
of the use of social media for political speech. Drawing
from a conceptual approach to public construction, we
offer insights into the broader implications of such a de-
velopment for the relationships between political actors’
and publics, including the role of journalism within such
a dynamic.
In doing so, findings contribute to the ongoing dis-
cussion of the shifts between media and political actors
by looking not only at the presence of social media use
by political actors, i.e., the adoption of media logics by
political actors (Hepp, 2013), but where this may signal
the activation and intensification of specific publics and
the extent to which this mode of constructing a pub-
lic may differ from past findings. Using SNA to assess
how publics are constituted in social media, their forma-
tions can be understood in terms of the history of imag-
ined, constructed, and addressed publics within western
democracies. This article now proceeds on two fronts,
first revisiting the conceptual bases for understand the
relationships between political actors and their publics,
and the intermediation between the two, then explor-
ing where SNA offers methodological opportunities for
examining this relationship.
2. The Political–Press–Public Axes
How are publics then constructed on Twitter, and specif-
ically by political actors in Europe? In this section we
highlight where an idealized vision of democratic soci-
ety, predicated on an exchange of information and po-
litical views between social actors, underpins both schol-
arly awareness of and concerns about how these commu-
nicative practices now take place. In doing so, we draw
on familiar themes, from the Habermasian public sphere
supposing a rational deliberative space of democratic di-
alogue from a socio-historical lens (1989) and the role of
communicative action in that constitution (1981), to the
contestation over how publics should be addressed from
Lippmann andDeweyquestioning the agency of ‘the pub-
Media and Communication, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 271–285 272
lic’ in such dialogue (Marres, 2005), to a range of scholar-
ship which takes into its discussion the nature, strength,
and effectiveness of considering a public sphere as a
guiding understanding of democratic societies (Couldry,
Livingstone, & Markham, 2007).
However, we find the greatest allegiance with public
sphere research where it has developed an understand-
ing not of one broad public, but of many publics. Such
work has moved our discussions towards considering
publics more complexly and as multiple (Fraser, 1990),
including alternative publics (Marx Ferree, Gamson,
Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002), counter-publics (Warner,
2002), and where these have been drawn together in
theorizing a digital public sphere online (Dahlgren, 2005;
Papacharissi, 2004). In considering how (and whether)
politicswithin Europe have becomemore fragmented, as
both recent elections and recent research has suggested
(Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018), this is a relevant point of de-
parture for our discussion, and all the more critical when
considering public formation by political actors for any
conception of a public sphere.
While a thorough dialogue between scholars of the
public sphere would be beyond the scope of this article,
we nevertheless need to highlight where a critical exam-
ination of the nature of publics in particular can bene-
fit our examination of the nature of constructed publics.
As a starting point for understanding the outward-facing
communication of political actors, Warner (2002) offers
a useful distinction between the public as the broad, as-
sumptive, and undifferentiated populace within a partic-
ular territory or space, and specific publics, as smaller
subsets of this larger public which exist based on discrete
commonalities, formed by and through communication
reinforcing such commonalities. As he argues, such “a
public is a space of discourse organized by nothing other
than discourse itself....It exists by virtue of being ad-
dressed” (2002, p. 50). In line with Warner (2002) we
conceptualize the idea of specific publics as groupswhich
are constructed within communicative spaces when ad-
dressed, adding that these specific publics can be mar-
shalled towards political ends. In other words, such a
public is activated when messages salient to it are am-
plified within a network (Papacharissi, 2014).
For political actors, understanding ‘their’ specific
public has allowed actors to focus on what types of
communication best reinforce their position as it re-
gards their specific publics, refining and tailoring politi-
cal speech based on this assumption in order to ‘tacti-
cally’ appeal to that public (Ross, Fountaine, & Comrie,
2015). Inversely, for members of the public an assump-
tion about what constitutes their belonging to a specific
public allows individuals to imagine themselves within a
group of like-minded individuals, who furthermore share
some stake in being seen through such an association
(Anderson, 1983; cf. Broersma & Koopmans, 2010 for
examples of ’imagined communities’ beyond the nation
state). For both political actors and members of the pub-
lic, specific publics are further constructed when this
sense of belonging is made salient through the way that
public is addressed—on both levels; this includes being
addressed by political actors within campaigning and po-
litical speech, but also between members of that pub-
lic within ‘everyday’ political talk (Graham, Jackson, &
Wright, 2015). Dahlgren (2005, p. 149) speaks of these
as “discursive interactional processes”, though he sees
greater benefit in moving away from narrow specific
publics, arguing broader interactions between specific
groups are a key aspect of public formation, enrich-
ing civic cultures when members of publics find shared
points of interaction beyond their own specific concerns.
While this may be ideal, and reflects one way of un-
derstanding public formation, it is nevertheless not ex-
clusively the case as we also see publics constituted
around an even narrower construction, including as issue
publics, also constructed through communicative acts
(Poor, 2005).
Taken together, these discussions allow us to ap-
proach the construction of publics through the ways
members of society are spoken of as a group, and spo-
ken to as a group with a vested interest in certain dia-
logues within society. When we turn to social media in
general and Twitter in particular, we can see this forma-
tion of the public as one which “comes into being only
in relation to texts and their circulation” (Warner, 2002,
p. 50). This involves looking not only to the nature of
the communicative content—e.g., political speech, me-
diated on Twitter—but also the communicative network
within which that communication takes place as a re-
flection of that construction, seeing the formation of
these networks through the affordances of the platform
as a type of communicative act (Marwick & boyd, 2010,
p. 115). This allows us to both understand network for-
mation as a discourse, and therefore a formof public con-
struction whereby publics are ‘coming into being’, and
the breadth or narrowness of that construction. Breadth
is apparent when we think of political actors speaking to
audiences of citizens as a collective group in order to re-
inforce their coherence (Bennett, 2012), and narrowness
when we think of these same actors speaking to audi-
ences of potential voters in ways which differentiate one
public from another (Bruns & Burgess, 2011). This is re-
flected in our first research question:
RQ1: How do different political actors, operating in
different political contexts, address the publics they
intend to construct on Twitter?
Thus, publics are not seen here as inherent or essential-
ist, but as constructed when social actors make certain
assumptions about their public and when these assump-
tions are reflected in the ways political actors speak, in-
cluding how they construct their social media networks.
This includes assumptions about what is relevant, or not,
to a public, and what would be of interest, or not, to a
public. This also considers speech both in terms of the
contents of political speech and the organization of com-
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municative networks (i.e., social networks) within which
messages are conveyed. This returns our attention to
the nature of ‘being addressed’ for understanding the
construction publics through political actors’ speaking to
members of publics, including where that speech takes
place—whether indirectly through journalistic media or
directly through political actors’ own use of media.
2.1. Shifting Media Power: From Intermediary
to Interlocutor
From seeing the construction of publics in the ways out-
lined above, we argue that networks of publics and po-
litical actors can be considered as engaged in a process
of ‘relational construction’. In doing so, we argue, pay-
ing attention to the ways these are constructed through
communication, between actors, measured in the nodes
and edges of a network, is a useful avenue for under-
standing. Conceptually, we see this as drawing our atten-
tion to the shifting roles of news media within the medi-
ated dynamics of political communication. In this section,
we consider the publicness of political actors’ commu-
nication within specific political-journalistic-public axes
which have traditionally underpinned a theoretical and
normative understanding of the public sphere as discur-
sive, engaged in deliberation of important topics for soci-
ety, and benefiting from the mediation of these delibera-
tions within society. This is broadly described as the me-
diated public sphere,whereinmedia act as key intermedi-
aries between those in power and thewider publicwithin
societies (Brands & Voltmer, 2011; Couldry et al., 2007).
Placing media within the construction of publics for
politics begins as a socio-historical question, considering
an ‘imagined’ public and the role newsmedia played pre-
viously in shaping an understanding of the public. Bene-
dict Anderson’s (1983) and Jürgen Habermas’ (1989) the-
ses offer resonant starting points, as each offers a com-
pelling account of the mediation of information as a con-
structive force for societies, and this force is associated
with newsmedia in the traditional sense. FromAnderson,
we see news as the serialization of our shared narratives
which reinforce our sense of communitarian belonging
(to a nation). From theHabermasian public spherewhere
a public seeks to engage in deliberative democratic pro-
cesses, media provide the public with the information
necessary to do so. In each version of understanding
the nature of constructed communities (as publics), so-
cieties benefited from the mediation of public deliber-
ation towards public understanding throughout history.
As Nerone writes, this was a role ‘the press’—as a collec-
tive institution in western democracies—adopted while
promoting their idealized role of informing the citizenry
of the affairs of the day (Nerone, 2015, p. 143).
Returning to Dahlgren’s emphasis on civic culture,
he argues that even within a fractured political environ-
ment we can look to see the public sphere and its spe-
cific publics more broadly than specific audiences being
catered to by specific messages. He sees publics forming
based on “minimal shared commitments” (2005, p. 158),
of which Dahlgren identifies: values, affinity, knowledge,
identities, and practices. In sharing, interaction becomes
key in constituting a public, arguing that for the forma-
tion of publics, interaction rests on two dimensions:
First, it has to do with the citizens’ encounters with
the media—the communicative processes of making
sense, interpreting, and using the output. The second
aspect of interaction is that between citizens them-
selves, which can include anything from two—person
conversations to large meetings. (2005, p. 149)
Moving from Dahlgren’s conceptualization to exploring
how these are taking place, we can highlight two points
of critical divergence: the shift in the nature of ‘the me-
dia’ in this dynamic, and the nature of ‘interaction’ be-
tween political actors and citizens.When Dahlgren raises
the idea of “citizens’ encounters with themedia” as inter-
action, he points at least obliquely to a view of the me-
dia as a consolidated profession (Waisbord, 2013), and as
a distinct set of social actors committed to sharing fact-
based information with a public in their interest, harken-
ing back to the development of ‘the press’ within democ-
racies (Nerone, 2015). As a substantive member of the
public sphere, ‘the media’ (or ‘the press’) held a vaunted
position within the democratic process, indebted to in-
forming citizenries as an intermediary between the pub-
lic members of a space—most often a nation—and the
powerful within that space—most often political actors.
With the increased adoption of media logics by political
actors in a digital era, scholars increasingly ask where
that may be worth reconsidering by first unpacking how
this initially took shape.
To begin with, in these visions of the press intermedi-
ating between the public and those in power, there are
explanatory challenges. For one, the imagined commu-
nity version of a public Anderson (1983) offers was pred-
icated in part on the ritualized shared consumption of
news content, a dynamic that has been surpassed by the
repertoires and individualized practices of social media
use (Hasebrink, 2017). Furthermore, the public sphere
of Habermas emphasizing deliberation and rationality,
has likewise been confronted by the way it negated al-
ternative publics (Fraser, 1990). Upon further scrutiny it
struggles to reflect the ways in which publics engage dif-
ferently (and divergently) in discourse which is neither
deliberative nor rational (Boyte, 1992, p. 344; Richards,
2018). That there was an institution committed to ide-
alized informative functions like ‘the press’ in the first
place is also vulnerable to critique, not least in the his-
tories of the news media in the countries we explore
here where pillarization in the Dutch context (Wijfjes,
2017), informal political allegiances between parties and
news media in the UK (Curran & Seaton, 2009), and a re-
cent history with authoritarian control in Spain (Siebert,
Peterson, & Schramm, 1956), each offers specific coun-
ternarratives to such a vision.
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Within these dynamics, we also see where news me-
dia have been shown to be far from neutral arbiters of
information for an idealized public good, as they are also
invested in constituting specific publics which they imag-
ine, speak to, and strive to maintain—particularly from
the early twentieth century onward, as an increasingly
literate populace and an increasingly industrial press
saw the need to understand, address, and grow a pub-
lic (Steel & Broersma, 2016). As Conboy and Eldridge
(2018) have argued, news media while often wedded to
democratic inclinations nevertheless benefit from imag-
ining publics they can assume, address, and in ideal cir-
cumstances rely on for economic support through ongo-
ing readership. News publics historically, however, were
rarely truly known; in line with Anderson (1983), they
were at best ‘imagined’ as consolidated groups of social
actors (sometimes imagined with the benefit of market
research which gave some measure of their interests).
Oncewe accept that publics are imagined, andwebe-
gin to consider how they are addressed as such through
what the newspapers identified as important for that
public, we can see as well where members of the pub-
lic could hold at least some expectation that the press
would speak up on their behalf. While in reality this pic-
ture has also struggled in its idealism (Hampton, 2010),
we nevertheless see in it how publics are constructed
within the discursive spaces where they are addressed.
As news media ‘interacted’ with their specific publics,
employing language which activated the communities
they spoke to and making salient the topics which they
saw as importance (cf. Conboy, 2006 for an illustrative
discussion of this dynamic with British tabloids), in a par-
allel construction to the ways political actors imagine,
speak to, and make salient issues relevant to a public,
thereby constructing that specific public.
As above, whether disaggregating a public into
publics, or critiquing the ability of the press to genuinely
speak for the public and not just against the powerful
(Steel, 2017), cracks in the normative picture of journal-
ism as serving democratic ends through constructing this
public have been made evident (Eldridge & Steel, 2016).
This is where we find ourselves in this article, emerging
from the first two decades of the twenty-first century
with newquestions to be explored about the relationship
between publics, the press, and political actors who, as
the arguments from theory allow, warrant reimagining
within ever-evolving communicative relationships. This
brings us to a point of seeing the construction of a pub-
lic not only as a political exercise, outlined above, but as
an exercise endeavored by media interested in securing
audiences. This points to our second research question:
RQ2: Do political actors’ Twitter networks reflect a
power shift in terms of the construction of a public?
Taking this as an entree towards reflecting the relation-
ships constructed within democratic spaces, the concep-
tion of a constructed public offers us a path towards ex-
amining how communication between groups of social
actors can lead to the mediated construction not of the
public, but of certain publics. In line with Griffin (1996),
and Fraser (1990), this takes a view within democratic
societies of publics as multiple—coexisting in differen-
tiated public spheres within societies—where multiple
constructions may emerge.
2.2. Towards Reimagining the Constructed Public:
Shifting Power
Some of the questions posed above have initial hypothe-
ses which we can consider, pointing us toward scholar-
ship on the mediatization of politics as a broad set of
literature which explores one aspect of this reimagining
(cf. Hepp, Hjarvard, & Lundby, 2015, as a starting point).
From work on mediatization, we no longer look to the
press as the intermediary between political actors and
the publics they speak to, and now recognize political ac-
tors doing this on their own accord, and as the discursive
spaces of political activities as more hybrid (Chadwick,
2017). To the extent mediatization speaks to the ways
in which political actors in particular have embraced me-
dia logics to achieve political ends, we see this initially
as mapping political communication onto the expecta-
tions of a political journalistic class (Strömbäck, 2008,
p. 236). However, as social media took hold, politicians
could step past journalists altogether and directly ad-
dress their public audience (Broersma & Graham, 2015).
In recent years, this ability of political actors to reach
beyond news media has not only left journalistic actors
outside the mediation of politics, it has also resulted in
journalists actingmore as interlocutor than intermediary.
They are resigned at times to an outsider position, react-
ing to rather than establishing the salient discussions of
politics (Eldridge & Bødker, 2018).
Where the concept of mediatization speaks at length
to the shifting of media and political logics between me-
dia and political actors, as Broersma and Graham (2015)
write, with social media this is not merely an adaptation
of media forms for campaign or political speech. Such
shifts also reflect a push to consolidate power within
the communicative spaces of online media, overtak-
ing others who previously held such control. Broersma
and Graham describe processes of adaptation, as politi-
cians adopting Twitter as a means of communicating di-
rectly with publics, thereby mollifying the initial chal-
lenge posed by social media which emerged as alterna-
tive communicative venues, outside their and journal-
ism’s traditional routines. Lest journalists cry foul at such
developments, their own adoption of Twitter alsomoved
towardsmuting the challenge socialmedia posed to their
own practices (Lasorsa, Lewis, & Holton, 2012; Parmelee,
2013). This does, however, highlight where aspects of
mediatization as the adoption of media logic by polit-
ical actors, may have now developed further towards
disintermediation—or the specific absenting of journal-
istic actors from their traditional role as communicators
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between publics and politics (Katz, 1988; Katz & Dayan,
1994). To the extent this emerges within networks of po-
litical and public actors, the implications for journalism
within democratic societies warrant renewed considera-
tion within the context of our third research question.
RQ3: What are the broader implications of this power
shift for the socio-functional roles of journalistic
actors?
3. A Network Approach to Public Construction
The approach of using social networks as an analytical
frame focuses on the different kinds of relationships be-
tween actors which form the social system, including be-
tween political actors and their publics (Borgatti, Everet,
& Johnson, 2013). Social networks are operationalized
as empirical phenomena of social relations in a concrete
social or cultural context which have their own charac-
teristics (Belloti, 2015; Borgatti et al., 2013). Critical for
this understanding is seeing online networks as oneman-
ifestation of social networks, recognizing such networks
provide structure to society and exist beyond the digital
spaces where they are perhaps most visible.
Focusing first on the online space and digital net-
works, key authors who have developed SNA point out
the relevance of the social networks in the discussions
or conversations taking place among different actors.
Through analysis, we can see where these conversa-
tions are bidirectional and where they are multidirec-
tional (Aragón, Gómez, García, & Kaltenbrunner, 2017),
and how the social space is formed by different ac-
tors (as nodes) and the communication exchange be-
tween them—so-called links or edges (Borgatti et al.,
2013). These actors—in our study, political parties and
politicians—have their own characteristics; so-called at-
tributes, through which it is possible to categorize, de-
fine, and differentiate each node (Borgatti et al., 2013).
When looking at the relationship between nodes,
we are focused on ‘relational events’ (Atkin, 1977).
Relational events are not a permanent relationship
established between actors, rather they are relation-
ships established for particular ends or during particu-
lar moments—in our case non-campaigns, as off-peak
political moments. This kind of digital network relation-
ship is formed by interactions and flows, where flows are
outcomes of the different interactions and the interac-
tions are part of the medium or context of these nodes
(Borgatti et al., 2013).
There are two kinds of SNA. First is the analysis of
the whole network; second is the analysis of the nodes,
or actors, which form the network. For the whole net-
work analysis, we use cohesion indicators (including den-
sity, reciprocity, and transitivity). For the nodes analysis,
we use degree centrality (including in-degree and out-
degree), as well as measures of between, eigenvector,
and closeness centrality. According to Freeman (1979)
in his research on offline social networks, the degree
value is understood as the number of connections be-
tween nodes or vertices and it is possible to differenti-
ate between the connections that a node receives (in-
degree) and the connections that a node sends (out-
degree). This concept is especially relevant because it
allows researchers to identify the role each node plays
within a network, including social media networks.
In this approach, there are two kind of nodes which
can be categorized according to the value of in-degree
and out-degree centrality. On the one hand there are pro-
grammers, which have a high in-degree value. These are
the nodes that set the message and define the frame-
work of the conversation within a network of actors.
Second in such a network are mobilizer nodes. These
have a high out-degree value, and are primarily involved
in disseminating the message within the social network
(Padovani & Pavan, 2016).
3.1. The Cases
This article examines the tweets of political actors (par-
ties and politicians) in theUK, theNetherlands, and Spain
and the ways they use Twitter. Using SNA approaches,
we examine within the network activities of such actors
the ways in which publics are being constructed; a find-
ing of this would reinforce the supposition that political
actors have further shifted power from journalistic ac-
tors. As an approach towards identifying where specific
publicsmay ormay not be addressed, it further takes into
consideration the nature of that construction, how dy-
namic the resultant publics are, and whether the percep-
tion of fragmented publics has been realized or, alterna-
tively, where it may be overstated.
By selecting three countries with different me-
dia systems—Liberal (UK), Democratic Corporatist (the
Netherlands), and Polarized Pluralist (Spain)—we can see
where different patterns of public construction relate to
the historical nature of these countries media systems,
and the closer or further connection betweenmedia and
political actors in each (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). This ad-
dresses a (largely) two-party political system and liberal,
very competitive media system in the UK, a corporatist
system in the Netherlands where many parties compete
in such a way where ruling coalitions are the norm, and
a media system which has (historically) reflected this
and has a strong public ethos, and the polarized pluralist
Spain, where media and politics both reflect a dynamic,
multi-party, system. Using these examples and this ap-
proach, this article offers a study of the supposed emer-
gence of narrow political publics, being catered to by spe-
cific political actors to the exclusion of others.
We analyze the Twitter accounts of seat-holding par-
ties in parliament and their leaders. All accounts were
gathered through Twitter’s REST API, using the software
package COSMO, developed by the University of Gronin-
gen. Unfortunately, not all accounts returned data in the
given period. However, this approach provided us with
enough material to further theoretically explore how
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publics are constructed on social media, the aim of our
article. We chose the period of 9 June till 7 July 2018 to
avoid any specific political campaign or election period
in any of the three countries. In such cases more height-
ened activity and more specific types of construction—
the construction of an electorate, rather than a pub-
lic, geared towards voting, promoting a platform, etc.—
would be anticipated. For each of the countries we have
studied, this timespan also follows periods of particular
political tumult, from the June 2017 General Election in
the UK under the cloud of carrying out Brexit, to the
March 2017 General Election in the Netherlands, which
was followed by more than 200 days of negotiations to
form a governing coalition, to the Spanish General Elec-
tion in June 2016, and more pointedly the Catalan inde-
pendence referendum in October of 2017. By choosing a
period of relatively low formal political activity, we hope
to gain a fuller picture of the construction of publics out-
side of themore persuasive activities of such periods (i.e.,
to see the construction of publics, rather thanmerely the
appeal for potential votes). The total number of tweets
per country are highlighted below (Table 1). Thus, it is
possible to identify the number of tweets (N tweets), and
accounts media, journalists, and citizens (N actors ana-
lyzed)withwhompoliticians and political parties interact
(the edges column).
3.2. Nodes Analysis: Findings
From this point, by examining the so-called ego networks
of these accounts (Borgatti et al., 2013; Pérez-Altable,
2015), wework in linewith Elisa Bellotti’s thesis that “net-
work science starts from the observation of actors entan-
gled in meaningful relations in contextualized environ-
ments” (2015, p. 3). SNA allows us to focus on the official
Twitter accounts of the 18 political parties and the 22 ac-
counts of politicians as nodes, allowing us to better know
how centralized the political networks and engagement
of these actors through the ways they act, interact, and
connect with other nodes (Table 2). We generated the
three node lists from our dataset using UCINET software,
indicating the name of the node (the political party or
politician’s Twitter handle) that is ‘sending’ a tie (a tweet
ormessage) andhowmany (‘N tweets’) are sent (Borgatti
et al., 2013).
3.3. Whole Network Analysis: Findings
The whole network analysis is based on cohesion mea-
sures; in other words, the connections between the
nodes (actors) that form networks. Cohesion is under-
stood as the structure of the network according to the
relation in terms of proximity or distance between the
Table 1. Total number of tweets analyzed, per country.
Country N tweets N actors analyzed Edges
Spain 7746 1534 9307
The Netherlands 975 408 789
United Kingdom 5135 1694 5637
Table 2. Accounts analyzed, per country.
Spanish Twitter N tweets Dutch Twitter N tweets United Kingdom Twitter N tweets
accounts accounts accounts
@marianorajoy 16 @vvd 23 @10downingstreet 91
@Rafa_Hernando 229 @dijkhoff 12 @theresa_may 58
@PSOE 750 @groenlinks 78 @UKLabour 223
@sanchezcastejon 76 @jesseklaver 14 @jeremycorbyn 258
@ahorapodemos 816 @MarijnissenL 47 @theSNP 834
@Pablo_Iglesias_ 360 @pvda 92 @NicolaSturgeon 295
@CiudadanosCs 1898 @LodewijkA 138 @LibDems 269
@Albert_Rivera 303 @christenunie 64 @vincecable 80
@Esquerra_ERC 1927 @50pluspartij 97 @duponline 129
@JoanTarda 153 @HenkKrol 89 @DUPleader 52
@ehbildu 818 @keesvdstaaij 52 @sinnfeinireland 918
@oskarmatute 400 @F_azarkan 105 @MaryLouMcDonald 225
@fvdemocratie 164 @Plaid_Cymru 1030
@thegreenparty 234
@CarolineLucas 263
@jon_bartley 176
Total 7746 Total 975 Total 5135
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actors, and the structure of the network according to the
connections or exchanges between nodes. If the network
of a political party is not cohesive, this would show little
to no relationship between party members. In consider-
ing the sociality of networks, this would indicate a neg-
ative structure to the party when it comes to decision-
making. Table 3 reveals the density and transitivity val-
ues which contribute to the overall cohesion of the three
whole networks analyzed. Density is understood as the
relationships within a network regarding the potential
number of connections. According to the density value, a
high density means a trusted network with an important
communication exchange (where 0 is no cohesion and 1
is completely cohesive). Thus, big networks formed by a
large number of nodes often have a low density, and in-
versely smaller networks are often denser and more co-
hesive (Coleman, 1988, as cited in Kane, Alavi, Labianca,
& Borgatti, 2014).
Transitivity, on the other hand, measures the proba-
bility that two nodes have a relationship if both have a
third node in common. The more nodes that are related,
the more likely it is that third node will also be related
to the first ones, resulting in a homogeneous network
(e.g. my friends’ friends aremy friends; Kane et al., 2014).
As Table 3 shows, the cohesion of each of the three net-
works is not significant, which reflects perhaps the na-
ture of discord between political actors or the diversity
of leaders and accounts examined, and may further re-
flect the breadth of these networks.
From the second level of analysis—the character-
istics of the nodes within each network, the degree
centrality (in-degree and out-degree)—we can differen-
tiate between programmers (Table 4) and mobilizers
(Table 5). This distinguishes between actors which are
able to set the message more than any other accounts
(programmers), and those which mostly respond to
these ‘programmer’ messages through the affordances
of Twitter, including retweets, likes, or quoting, as ‘mo-
bilizers’. Eigenvalue centrality ranges from zero to infin-
ity. Therefore, the higher the value, the greater the in-
degree or the out-degree. Looking at the degree central-
ity of each type of actor, we can see the extent to which
different actors are effectively using communicative acts
in ways which help to establish publics, either through
being prominent or establishing their voices as promi-
nent, and second where they are effective at being fur-
ther amplified by their followers and those who interact
with them.
3.3.1. Spain
In the Spanish case, Figure 1 shows @sanchezcastrejon,
@PSOE, @CiudadanosCs and @ahorapodemos in green;
@Esquerra_ERC, in orange; and @Alber_Rivera, in blue.
The different colors reflect different kinds of nodes ac-
cording to the modularity of the network, where modu-
larity is understood as the diverse groups of nodes. This
figure reflects how groups of nodes (thosewith the same
color) have strong connections on Twitter between them-
selves. The size of the labels is based on the in-degree
centrality; in other words, which actor sends the mes-
sage in the Spanish network we explore.
Table 3. Network cohesion, by country.
Network Spain United Kingdom The Netherlands
Density 0.1% 0.001 0.3% 0.003 6.7% 0.067
Transitivity 11.6% 0.116 0.9% 0.009 7.9% 0.079
Table 4. Programmers, by country.
Spain Programmers United Kingdom Programmers The Netherlands Programmers
@marianorajoy 1000 @10downingstreet 0 @vvd 2000
@Rafa_Hernando 0 @theresa_may 7000 @dijkhoff 1000
@PSOE 6000 @UKLabour 4000 @groenlinks 1000
@sanchezcastejon 7000 @jeremycorbyn 4000 @jesseklaver 3000
@ahorapodemos 3000 @theSNP 4000 @MarijnissenL 1000
@Pablo_Iglesias_ 2000 @NicolaSturgeon 1000 @pvda 0
@CiudadanosCs 3000 @LibDems 2000 @LodewijkA 2000
@Albert_Rivera 3000 @vincecable 2000 @christenunie 1000
@Esquerra_ERC 4000 @duponline 2000 @50pluspartij 1000
@JoanTarda 1000 @DUPleader 1000 @HenkKrol 1000
@ehbildu 1000 @sinnfeinireland 1000 @keesvdstaaij 2000
@oskarmatute 1000 @MaryLouMcDonald 1000 @F_azarkan 0
@Plaid_Cymru 1000 @fvdemocratie 1000
@thegreenparty 1000
@CarolineLucas 4000
@jon_bartley 2000
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Table 5.Mobilizers, by country.
Spain Mobilizers United KingdomMobilizers The Netherlands Mobilizers
@marianorajoy 6000 @10downingstreet 24000 @vvd 5000
@Rafa_Hernando 46000 @theresa_may 18000 @dijkhoff 10000
@PSOE 226000 @UKLabour 99000 @groenlinks 33000
@sanchezcastejon 29000 @jeremycorbyn 102000 @jesseklaver 1000
@ahorapodemos 189000 @theSNP 343000 @MarijnissenL 23000
@Pablo_Iglesias_ 162000 @NicolaSturgeon 244000 @pvda 38000
@CiudadanosCs 257000 @LibDems 68000 @LodewijkA 87000
@Albert_Rivera 115000 @vincecable 45000 @christenunie 43000
@Esquerra_ERC 428000 @duponline 69000 @50pluspartij 37000
@JoanTarda 103000 @DUPleader 29000 @HenkKrol 29000
@ehbildu 198000 @sinnfeinireland 214000 @keesvdstaaij 31000
@oskarmatute 184000 @MaryLouMcDonald 158000 @F_azarkan 68000
@Plaid_Cymru 269000 @fvdemocratie 61000
@thegreenparty 85000
@CarolineLucas 125000
@jon_bartley 71000
Figure 1. Twitter network, Spanish case.
In such a network, we can see that the @PSOE ac-
count (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, the traditional
center-left wing party) and its candidate @sanchezcas-
trejon are the primary programmers within the net-
work, able to disseminate political messages effectively.
Then, we find @Esquerra_ECR (Esquerra Republicana
de Catalunya), @ahorapodemos (a new left party),
@CiudadanosCs (centre-right party) and@Albert_Rivera
(Ciudadanos’ party leader). In contrast, we find that
@Rafa_Hernando (Partido Popular political leader) is
not a programmer, but rather he spreads the message
in the Spanish network—a mobilizer role. The density
(0.01) and transitivity (0.116) values suggest that the
Spanish network is not cohesive—which is common in
big networks—though this also reflects this is a hier-
archical network. As regards media, we also see that
media Twitter accounts are mentioned by the political
parties and politicians, including @rtve, @europapress,
@elprogramaAR, @telecinco or @tve_tve. However, the
main purposes of these mentions are related to appear-
ances of the politicians in the media and, in these cases,
the message remains set by parties and politicians and
not media.
3.3.2. United Kingdom
Within the UK results, the account that stands out above
all is that of Conservative party leader andPrimeMinister
Theresa May. The in-degree value for her account is no-
tably higher than the others, followed by the parties’ ac-
counts@uklabour (UK Labour party) and@theSNP (Scot-
tish National Party) and by the politicians @jeremycor-
byn (Labour Party Leader) and @CarolineLucas (former
Green Party leader). Figure 2 shows the actors which
set themessage—programmers—with purple nodes and
larger labels. In this case, we want to highlight the role
played by @Plaid_cymru (Party of Wales) and @sinn-
feinireland (Sinn Fein; the Irish Republican party) ac-
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Figure 2. Twitter network, UK case.
counts. During the period of analysis, these Twitter ac-
counts were active in spreading the message which pro-
grammers set, acting as mobilizers. In addition, while
media and journalism accounts were found, such as
@thetimes or the festival account @TWT_Now, the de-
gree values are not significant, reflecting little interaction
with these accounts. Based on cohesion values, similar to
the Spanish case, the British network is also not cohesive
and is also a hierarchical network, based on the density
(0.003) and transitivity (0.009) values.
3.3.3. The Netherlands
Finally, our analysis of the Dutch case is based on the
smallest network, which (as shown in in Figure 3) allows
us to address clearly which political actors set the mes-
sage as programmers (big labels, red nodes) and which
nodes spread themessage asmobilizers. In this sense, we
are able to gain clearer insights into how publics are being
constructed and the nature of these publics. In Figure 3,
there is an equilibrium or kind of competition to set the
message. The account of Groen Links leader Jesse Klaver
has the highest value and overall, this account and those
of the @vvd (Conservative party), @LodewijkA (PvdA
leader) and @keesvdstaaij (SPG leader), are the primary
programmers; with the exception of the VVD, we there-
fore see the message within the network being set by
politicians’ accounts instead of by political party accounts.
Despite the fact that the Dutch network is smaller
than those previously analyzed—which could be sup-
posed to be more cohesive, and less hierarchical—the
results of density (0.067) and transitivity (0.079) discard
this thesis.
4. Discussion: An Initial Prognosis for Considering
Publics
In closing, we want to point to what the SNA approach
offers us in terms of insights into the construction of
publics within these three discrete national contexts,
and what the activities on Twitter of political actors
and parties in each case indicate for our understand-
ing of publics inWestern democracies. When considered
against the theoretical understanding of public construc-
tion we posed at the outset, we will unpack our data as
a reflection of that dynamic. However, we want to first
highlight a specific challenge in understanding ‘publics’
in these contexts encountered within social media re-
search. We tactically chose a discrete sample of seat-
holding prominent news actors, which limits the scope of
our empirical analysis. As we looked at a non-campaign
period, these are, first, the most active voices once elec-
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Figure 3. Twitter network, Dutch case.
tions have closed, and their followers are more likely to
be highly engaged. It would also be interesting for further
research to trace the construction of publics over time to
understand how publics might be continuously reassem-
bled. Second, it would be difficult if not impossible to cap-
ture the diversity of accounts which may also be engag-
ing in political speech beyond established parties and ac-
tors, such as journalists and news organizations, through
alternative approaches within the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, we can draw on empirical andmethod-
ological insights from our SNA approach to return to the
conceptual debates we outlined above. These offer us a
view into how publics are being constructed on Twitter
outside election periods. First, we do not see a bidirec-
tional or multidirectional communicative media. Instead,
withinwhole networks and the analysis of political actors
we overwhelmingly see the absence of cohesion, this is
the case in both large and smaller networks. In other
words, we are able to observe that while it is possible
to differentiate among groups of nodes corresponding
to the different parties and their candidates, we do not
see indications of an active exchange or conversation
among them. Secondly, through the nodes analysis we
are able to conclude that in the case of the UK and Spain
there are fewer nodes which set the message—fewer
programmers—than there are nodes which spread the
message. By contrast, in the Netherlands, the message
is set and spread by a higher number of political actors
and this takes place in in a more balanced way. Here we
find that from the networks we analyzed we are able to
rethink how public construction is taking place and the
familiar tripartite framework of news media, public, and
political actors, with an awareness of the limitations of
such an approach and within our specific study (for in-
stance, it focuses on one social media, which is just one
locus of public construction). This addresses our first re-
search question.
We also see reflected in our analysis some extant
understanding of political parties’ and actors’ construc-
tion of publics from this analysis—in that it is actively
engaged in doing so—and we can see where this is var-
ied across national contexts. Within the British network,
for instance, we are unsurprised when we see the Prime
Minister, Theresa May, as both a political agenda set-
ter and a prominent public figure within the mediated
discourse of politics. It is unsurprising her Twitter ac-
count is also prominent within this network. However,
despite there being a number of seat-holding parties in
the UK, within the structure of the network we do not
see other parties which have pronounced specific tar-
get publics (e.g., Plaid Cymru and Wales) also reflect-
ing programmer roles. Instead, we see they are more
inclined to interact with tweets from May. This may re-
flect the overwhelming prominence of Britain’s top two
parties, contra the Dutch case where coalition govern-
ments are the normandwherewe seemore actors in pro-
grammer roles. Similarly, in the Spanish case the network
analysis shows the highly fragmented nature of politics
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at a time when elections and referenda have widened,
rather than smoothed over, political differences (Esteve
del Valle & Borge Bravo, 2018). While in the Spanish and
UK networks this might suggest some tendency towards
the Habermasian ideal of a unified public sphere (one in
which everyone can take note of issues and these are ad-
dressed and discussed with the public at large) we are
wary to conclude such a space, as this fails to account for
the elite dominance we also witness in terms of network
hierarchies. In the Netherlands, however, we certainly
seem to observe more of a fragmentation of the public
sphere, something past findings and research would al-
low us to anticipate. This finding responds to our second
research question.
We would like to now turn to our final research
question—What are the broader implications of this
power shift for the socio-functional roles of journalistic
actors?—to advocate, in closing, for a renewed agenda
for exploring the orientation of power between newsme-
dia, political actors, and publics. What we argue here
is that beyond politicians eliding gatekeepers as they
actively construct publics online (Broersma & Graham,
2015), or journalists soliciting from Twitter public and
political commentary (Harder & Paulussen, 2016), we
see an elision of journalistic roles in the construction of
publics by politicians on Twitter. The work here shows
a circumventing of the previous politician/public orien-
tation which was predicated on a role for news media
(Strömbäck & Esser, 2017), and rather we see in the
Twitter activity from and by political actors the specific
constitution of their publics.
Thus, we look from these discussions to ask where
the dynamics have shifted from a Habermasian interme-
diary towards a discourse possibly between politicians
and the public, where news media are otherwise ex-
empted. As Strömbäck and Esser (2017) and Van Aelst
and Walgrave (2017) reflect in conversation with each
other, we may be able to transport the ‘information’ and
‘arena’ functions of media onto networks of Twitter—in
particular considering how politicians use media as a re-
source for public appeal, and for political message trans-
mission. This is mirrored in the assessment of ‘program-
mers’ and ‘mobilizers’. Such findings give us some lati-
tude to suppose that the mediated politics occurring on
Twitter is not only according to an informative function
(to disseminate political messages, or garner feedback)
but also to consider where the platforms now acts as a
discrete media arena of politics; in other words, where
the network reflects not merely discourse acts which
construct publics (Warner, 2002), but as constituting the
space within which public construction occurs, including
who is involved in that construction.
From these discussions, we note that withinWestern
democracies there is a prevalent set of expectations of
political actors to speak (in some fashion) to publics (of
some fashion) in order to convey their messages—be it
through a dominant press, or through othermechanisms.
From this, in lively political climates online, with vari-
ous stakeholders committed to various political agendas,
the salience of Fraser’s (1990) critique that there is no
one public and rather many publics has only intensified.
Within a mediated public sphere, we can expect to see
this reflected also in communicative networks on Twitter.
Thus, while we have had some cause to expect more me-
dia savvy political activity as the field of politics has in-
creasingly embraced amedia logic, theminimal presence
of an active engagement with news media within these
networks suggest this has moved towards a wholesale
adoption of the opportunities of social media for politi-
cal actors to get their messages out, independent of any
intermediating journalistic class on the platform.
The larger questions this raises are intensified by the
apparent disintermediation that has emerged in recent
years as political actors have availed themselves of the
affordances of social media to ‘mediatize’ their politi-
cal communication. We see this in our own analysis as
well, as news media actors are nearly absent from the
networks of political actors, and when they appear they
are used instrumentally for promotion. In response to
such trends, we ask ‘whither journalism?’, particularly
as we consider journalism’s historic role in constructing
publics among nations and their near-absencewithin the
networks of major political actors and parties. Conse-
quently, while it seems a rather ‘normal’ practice nowa-
days for political actors to approach their publics directly
through these socialmeans, this nevertheless opens new
questions for the axes that connect political actors, the
publics they address, and the role of critical voices in any
such engagement.
This article centered its arguments around the di-
rect communication by politicians with their perceived
publics as an alternative avenue for understanding the
role—or absence of a role—for journalism in these con-
texts, and in doing so it primarily offers a conceptual dis-
cussion of the shifting power center in the political-press-
public triangle. As a field in Western societies which de-
veloped in part on speaking to, and in part on speaking
for a public, any eliding of the journalistic voice in the
construction of political publics has implications for how
we speak of the press, politics, and publics within our so-
cieties, as each continues to find its footing in a digital
age. From the discussions we have outlined here, we ar-
gue for a renewed research agenda to continue assessing
these dynamics.
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